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I. INTRODUCTION: HELLFIRE
Silent and cold. At twenty thousand feet, the temperature is
minus ten degrees Fahrenheit. At almost a thousand miles per hour,
sound cannot keep up. Heat and noise struggle in the turbulence.
Three miles away, seven thousand miles from American soil, an
American citizen driving an empty road has ten seconds to live. As a
leader in an organization actively engaged in armed conflict against
the United States, this American citizen has become an enemy of the
United States. In response to the threat he poses to his fellow
Americans, his government added him to a kill list, targeted him, and
launched a military operation against him. The Hellfire finds its
mark. The heat and noise catch up.'
The United States targets and kills U.S. citizens, 2 but debate
rages over the targeted killing program's legality.3 The most recent
case, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, set the U.S. government against the
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") and the Center for
Constitutional Rights ("CCR"). 4 Around Christmas 2009, after the
1. This is based very loosely on actual events. See Dominic Rushe, Chris McGreal, Jason
Burke & Luke Harding, Anwar al-Awlaki Death: U.S. Keeps Role Under Wraps to Manage Yemen
Fallout, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 30, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/30/anwar-al-
awlaki-yemen (describing the Predator drone strike that killed Al-Aulaqi at 9:55 a.m. while he
was driving on a road outside Khasaf in the desert of Yemen's Jawf province); Charlie Savage,
Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, at Ai, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/middleeast/secret-us-memo-made-legal-case-to-kill-a-
citizen.html; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 597 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[A]
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Predator drone fired a Hellfire missile at a vehicle in Yemen
carrying an al-Qaeda leader, a citizen of the United States ... ").
2. Savage, supra note 1; Interview by Michael Isikoff with Michael Leiter, Dir., Nat'l
Counterterrorism Ctr., in Aspen, Colo. (June 30, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.nctc
.gov/press-room/speechesfleiter-transcript.aspen.institute_063010.pdf).
3. This Note will only examine legality. The issue of morality is too large to address here.
4. Al-Aulaqi v. United States, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissed because the
father lacked standing to bring suit on behalf of his adult son).
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government placed Anwar Al-Aulaqi on a kill list,5 his father, Nasser
A1-Aulaqi, challenged the placement. The legal battle saw substantial
coverage in the popular and legal press, 6 but the issue was never
decided on its merits. For A1-Aulaqi himself, the point is now moot-
we already killed him.7 After the killing, the U.S. Department of
Justice's Office of Legal Counsel for the Obama Administration
prepared a secret memo ("OLC memo")8 detailing why it believed the
practice was legal as applied to Al-Aulaqi.9 The Supreme Court has
not yet decided the legality of this type of targeted killing, but
members of the Court considered it when deciding a related issue.10
This Note argues the U.S. government can conduct
extrajudicial targeted killings of U.S. citizens legally by adhering to
international law and domestic due process protections. This Note
examines only targeted killings by the United States of its own
citizens. Its focus is therefore different and more constrained than
prior scholarship on targeted killing.1' This Note's conclusions differ
5. Savage, supra note 1.
6. See, e.g., Spencer Hsu, U.S. Officials Defend 'State Secrets' Claim in al-Aulaqi Suit,
WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2010, at A2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comwp-
dyn/contentlarticle2010/09/25/AR2010092503089.html (discussing the government's use of the
state secret privilege to dismiss the lawsuit brought by A1-Aulaqi); Kenneth Anderson, Judge
Dismisses Al-Aulaqi Targeted Killing Case, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 7, 2010),
http://www.volokh.com/2010/12/07/judge-dismisses-al-aulaqi-targeted-killing-case/ (providing an
initial reaction to the dismissal of the A1-Aulaqi case); Robert Chesney, Outline of the Al-Aulaqi
Opinion for Those in a Rush . . . . LAWFARE (Dec. 7, 2010),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/12/outline-of-the-al-aulaqi-opinion-for-those-in-a-rush
(providing an overview of the various issues in the case, including excerpts from Judge Bates's
opinion); Chez Pazienza, Killing an Arab-American: The Debate over Anwar al-Aulaqi, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chez-pazienza/anwar-al-
aulaqi-debate_b_741830.html (providing an overview of the Al-Aulaqi case and exploring the
merits of the government's policy); Times Topics: Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2011),
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/a/anwar-al-awlaki/index.html
(providing a biography and listing eighty articles in the New York Times on Al-Aulaqi).
7. Savage, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. Id. It is worth noting that the OLC memo was prepared after President Barack Obama
gave the order to kill Al-Aulaqi. Jesselyn Radack, Bush Logic in Secret Memo to Assassinate
American al-Awlaki, DAILY KOS (Oct. 9, 2011), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/1O/09/
1024407/-Bush-Logic-in-Secret-Memo-to-Assassinate-American-al-Awlaki.
10. Members of the Court, however, briefly considered it when deciding a related issue. See
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 597 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[A] Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) Predator drone fired a Hellfire missile at a vehicle in Yemen carrying an al Qaeda
leader, a citizen of the United States.").
11. See, e.g., David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial
Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence? 16 EuR. J. INT'L L. 171, 191 (2005) (focusing on the
targeted killing of terrorists in general).
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from more general examinations of targeted killing that based their
conclusions on treaties to which the United States is not a party.12
Part I introduces targeted killing. Part II provides background
information. It differentiates targeted killing from assassination and
execution. It then examines the legality of targeted killing generally,
under the frameworks of U.S. and international law. It describes some
of the theories advanced in favor of and against targeted killing. Part
II also establishes the minimum criteria under which targeted killing
is legal. Part III analyzes the issues at the heart of this Note,
identifying the additional protections afforded to American citizens
and overlaying them onto the targeted killing framework established
in Part II. It focuses primarily on the protections in the U.S.
Constitution. Part IV draws on the law as established in Parts II and
III to advocate the continued practice of targeted killing. It
recommends additional protections when the target is an American
citizen. Part V concludes that the U.S. government can effectively
target and kill U.S. citizens who are participating in armed conflict
against the United States abroad while maintaining due process
protections for all citizens by notifying the target and affording him an
opportunity for a hearing.
II. TARGETED KILLING IS A DISTINCT TYPE OF STATE ACTION
REQUIRING DISTINCT RULES
A. Extrajudicial Killing
Targeted killing does not have an agreed-upon definition under
international law. 13 For purposes of this Note, "targeted killing"
denotes a state's intentional and premeditated use of lethal force
through agents acting under color of law against a specific, reasonably
12. See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12,
1977 [hereinafter Protocol Il], 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. Both provide legal standards limiting the use
of targeted killing beyond the degree to which the United States is bound, because the United
States has not ratified these protocols to the Geneva Conventions.
13. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on
Targeted Killings, 7-8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston)




unobtainable individual. 14 It has become the preferred term for
military operations of this nature. In the context of U.S. operations,
targeted killing often involves a missile strike by an unmanned aerial
vehicle, the Predator drone, against a known terrorist.15 The
government elects to kill individuals who have military importance.
Targeted killings are extrajudicial, in that they do not require court
approval.1 6 Extrajudicial killings are not generally legal under
international law. 17 However, this Note argues that they can be legal
in certain extraordinary situations, including self-defense cases in
which the state addresses due process concerns.
An extrajudicial killing is a "deliberated killing not authorized
by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples."18 The term specifically excludes
"any such killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out
under the authority of a foreign nation."19 This exemption refers to
14. This definition tracks closely to the definition offered by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, with some important differences. I selected this
definition because of the Rapporteur's opposition to the practice. The modifications constrain it
to potentially legal targeted killing. Cf. id. 1 ("A targeted killing is the intentional,
premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting under colour of
law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in
the physical custody of the perpetrator.").
15. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 597 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[A]
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Predator drone fired a Hellfire missile at a vehicle in Yemen
carrying an al Qaeda leader, a citizen of the United States...."); Savage, supra note 1.
16. But, as opposed to "extrajudicial executions," they can be legal. Report of the Special
Rapporteur, supra note 13, 10.
17. See, e.g., European Convention on Human Rights art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
("Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for
which this penalty is provided by law."); Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 3, G.A. Res.
217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) ("Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and
security of person."); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52 (Dec. 16, 1966) ("Every
human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law."); African
[Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 4, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 ("Every
human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may
be arbitrarily deprived of this right."); Organization of American States, American Convention on
Human Rights art. 4, Nov. 21, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 ("Every person has the
right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law .. "); American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man art. 1, O.A.S. Res. XXX (May 2, 1948) ("Every human being has
the right to life, liberty and the security of his person.").
18. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, §3(a), 106 Stat. 73 (1991).
This definition is only legally binding with regard to this particular statute, but its clarity is
persuasive.
19. Id.
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killings that are lawful under International Humanitarian Law
("IHL"), which only applies to war, and Human Rights Law ("HRL"),
which applies more generally.
B. Killings in Territories of Armed Conflict
Military strikes are most common in the context of armed
conflict, so the discussion begins there. Within a territory engaged in
armed conflict, targeted killing is a more clear-cut proposition. The
familiar legal framework of IHL applies in armed conflicts whether of
an international character or not of an international character.20 With
some exceptions, 21 the Geneva Conventions apply only in international
armed conflicts.
Military commanders have greater latitude in zones of armed
conflict than they have in peaceful areas. 22 Within zones of armed
conflict, commanders can select lawful targets for attack. The OLC
memo found that Al-Aulaqi's distance from the battlefield did not
preclude a U.S. attack targeting him.23 In the context of a global war,24
commanders have always possessed authority to act that extends
beyond the front lines. 25 Targeted killing is no different.
C. Targeted Killing vs. Assassination
Targeted killing and assassination are similar but distinct
operations that commentators often conflate. 26  Specifically,
20. In international law, and for purposes of this Note, "international" armed conflicts are
those between states, and specifically between "high contracting parties" to the Geneva
Conventions I-IV. See Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of
Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079,1084 (2008).
21. See, e.g., Protocol II, supra note 12, at 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (which applies to armed
conflicts not of an international character, but to which, as of this writing, the United States is
not a party); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 (concerning armed conflicts not of an international character).
22. See Rise of the Drones II: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat7 Security and Foreign
Affairs of the H. Comm. on Gov't Oversight and Reform, 111th Cong. 2-4 (2010) (testimony of
Mary Ellen O'Connell), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2010_hr/042810oconnell.pdf
(discussing the lawful use of combat drones).
23. Savage, supra note 1.
24. For the purpose of this Note, "global war" includes any ongoing armed action (the Global
War on Terror for example), not merely declared wars.
25. See W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 18 (1990) (noting
the practice of targeting noncombat areas when Hague Law was first being written).
26. See Savage, supra note 1 (describing the OLC position that the two operations are
distinct); cf. Yasir Qadhi, An Illegal and Counterproductive Assassination, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/02/opinion/sunday/
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assassinations are killings that are politically motivated and use
subterfuge, while targeted killings are military strikes. 27 This
distinction is important because President Ronald Reagan's Executive
Order 12,333 bans assassination. 28 In the section entitled "Prohibition
on Assassination," President Reagan ordered, "No person employed by
or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in,
or conspire to engage in, assassination."29 The order also prohibits
indirect participation in any "activities forbidden by [Executive Order
12,333]."30 Therefore, targeted killing is only legal if it is distinct from
assassination under Executive Order 12,333.
Although Executive Order 12,333 is just the latest in a series
beginning with President Gerald Ford's Executive Order 11,905, none
of the executive orders defines assassination. 31 Nonetheless, an
analysis of how the executive orders refer to assassination is
potentially enlightening. President Ford's 1976 Executive Order, for
example, expressly prohibited "political assassination."32  Both
Presidents Jimmy Carter's and Ronald Reagan's subsequent orders,
however, simply ban "assassination" without the modifier "political."33
Two possible and contradictory interpretations arise from President
assassinating.al-awlaki-was-counterproductive.html (describing the same drone attack as an
assassination).
27. See Savage, supra note 1 (concluding that the Executive Order "blocked unlawful
killings of political leaders outside of war, but not the killing of a lawful target in an armed
conflict").
28. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,952 (Dec. 4, 1981).
29. Id. President Reagan's executive order, in force now for nearly three decades, is the
latest in a series beginning with Executive Order 11,905 issued by President Gerald Ford in
February of 1976. Exec. Order No. 11,905 § 5(g), 41 Fed. Reg. 7703, 7733 (Feb. 18, 1976).
President Carter expanded the ban to include indirect participation with Executive Order 12,036
§§ 2-305, 2-307. 43 Fed. Reg. 3674, 3683, 3687 (Jan. 24, 1978); Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 2.11, 46
Fed. Reg. at 59,952.
30. Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 2.12, 46 Fed. Reg. at 59,952. It is worth noting that the text of
Executive Order 12,333 differs between section 2.11 and section 2.12 in that section 2.11 enjoins
all employees and agents of the U.S. government assassinating a person directly, but section 2.12
only enjoins members of the "Intelligence Community" from indirect participation in
assassination. Therefore, on its face, Executive Order 12,333 permits other employees and agents
of the U.S. government to participate in assassination indirectly so long as that participation
does not rise to the level of "conspiracy." However, as this Note concerns direct participation by
the U.S. government, further discussion of this issue is beyond its scope.
31. Id. at 46 Fed. Reg. at 59,941; Exec. Order No. 12,036, Exec. Order No. 11,905, 41 Fed.
Reg. at 7733; Exec. Order No. 12,333, 43 Fed. Reg. at 3683, 3687. See generally ELIZABETH B.
BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21037, ASSASSINATION BAN AND E.O. 12333: A BRIEF
SUMMARY, at CRS-1 (offering a concise overview of U.S. assassination policy).
32. Exec. Order No. 11,905 § 5(g), 41 Fed. Reg. at 7733 (Feb. 18, 1976).
33. Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 2.11, 46 Fed. Reg. at 59,952; Exec. Order No. 12,036 § 2-305,
43 Fed. Reg. at 3683.
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Carter's deletion of "political" from his order. He either meant the
1978 ban to include apolitical assassination or considered political
motives inherent to the definition of assassination, making the
modifier superfluous. 34  Based on the conduct of subsequent
administrations, including the current administration, the second
interpretation appears to be the one in force. Targeted killing is based
strictly on security concerns; assassination is political.
Another area of contention is whether the term "assassination"
applies to killings committed during armed conflict.35 The drafting
history of the three bans implies the orders apply only outside of
armed conflict. 36 The reports to Congress on the bans repeatedly use
language like "covert," "treacherous," or "surprise."37 Hague law, the
law of war, prohibits killing individuals "treacherously."38
Treacherousness helps distinguish lawful killing from cloak-and-
dagger assassination. Under Hague law, it is impermissible to kill a
person by surprise in peacetime, but it is permissible to use a surprise
attack to kill a person in war.39
Notwithstanding any of the above, the President can revoke or
modify Executive Order 12,333 by issuing a new executive order.
Executive orders do not bind executive practice any more than the
President wants them to, and the President can keep executive orders
secret if he so chooses. 40 Typically, new executive orders have to be
published in the Federal Register.41 However, when the President
determines that as a result of an attack or a threatened attack on the
United States, publication would be impracticable or would not "give
appropriate notice to the public," the President can suspend this filing
34. The Black's Law Dictionary definition supports this view, defining assassination as
"[t]he act of deliberately killing someone, esp. a public figure, usu. for hire or for political
reasons." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 130 (9th ed. 2009). Merriam-Webster defines the term as "to
murder (a usually prominent person) by sudden or secret attack often for political reasons."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1993).
35. BAZAN, supra note 31, at CRS-2.
36. Id. at CRS-2 to -3.
37. Id. at CRS-3 to -4.
38. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex:
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(b), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, 187 Consol. T.S. 227 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV].
39. Id. art. 24 (permitting "ruses of war"); BAZAN, supra note 31, at CRS-4.
40. See, e.g., James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com2005/12/16/washingtor
16program.html (describing one such secret executive order once its existence was leaked).
41. 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a) (2006).
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requirement. 42 So while targeted killing is distinct from assassination
and, under currently published laws, must be distinct to be legal, the
distinction matters little. Even classifying all targeted killings as
assassinations within the meaning of Executive Order 12,333 would
be of little practical importance, as any President who wished to
continue the programs could secretly modify the order to carve out an
exception for whatever activities he wished to conduct.
D. Targeting Killing vs. Execution
The first image to come to mind when picturing the U.S
government killing a U.S. citizen is that of an execution. Targeted
killing and execution are distinct from one another, but legal scholars
often compare and conflate the two.43 It is therefore worthwhile at the
outset to distinguish targeted killing from execution.
Execution is a judicial, postconviction sentence reserved for a
narrow subset of the most serious offenders within a narrow subset of
all possible crimes. State law, as opposed to international law, governs
execution. 44 Execution provides years of appellate process and judicial
review. If targeted killing is execution, all feasible judicial review is
woefully inadequate. To survive as a practice, therefore, targeted
killing must be distinguished from execution.
Execution differs from targeted killing in terms of the person
the government targets. States execute criminals who have, by
definition, been convicted of crimes. The government reserves targeted
killings for individuals of military significance who cannot be brought
to justice by other means. 45 In the United States, the federal and state
governments can execute criminals. 46 Execution is a judicial process
42. Id. § 1505(c).
43. See, e.g., Kretzmer, supra note 11, at 173 (citing the Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories
Occupied by Israel Since 1967, Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab
Territories, Including Palestine, Report of the Human Rights Inquiry Commission, 53-64,
Comm'n Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. E/CN.412001/121 (Mar. 16, 2001)).
44. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 950 (2007) (describing the impact of state law
violations on prisoner eligibility for execution); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 241 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (showing state law to govern except when in violation of the
Constitution).
45. Savage, supra note 1 ('The legal analysis, in essence, concluded that Mr. Awlaki could
be legally killed, if it was not feasible to capture him.").
46. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2006) (allowing the death penalty for first-degree murder);
10 U.S.C. § 885 (2006) (allowing the death penalty for desertion in time of war).
2012] 257
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and therefore has the protections inherent to a judicial process, while
targeted killings are extrajudicial.
The federal government may target and kill individuals who
have not been convicted of crimes, because targeted killing and
execution serve different purposes. Execution is a punishment for a
crime. Targeted killing is not a punishment. It is a military strike. The
state does not intend to right a wrong but to further a military
objective. Viewed in this light, prior judicial review of targeted
killings-like prior judicial review of military decisions to kill enemies
(U.S. citizens or not) on the battlefield-is unnecessary.
As a practical matter, the United States already engages in
targeted killings. During questioning before Congress, Dennis Blair,
while Director of National Intelligence, told then Representative Peter
Hoekstra that if the government thinks "direct action will involve
killing an American, we get specific permission to do that."47 Targeted
killings by the United States in the War on Terror take place inside
and outside of regions of armed conflict. 48 The primary factors the U.S.
intelligence community considers when deciding whether to direct a
targeted killing against an American are, according to Blair, "whether
that American is involved in a group that is trying to attack us,
whether that American is a threat to other Americans."49 Accordingly,
the secret OLC memo concluded the government could kill Al-Aulaqi
because it was not feasible to capture him, he posed a significant
threat to Americans, and Yemeni authorities were unable or unwilling
to stop him.50
III. THE LEGALITY OF DESIGNATING, TARGETING, AND KILLING AROUND
THE WORLD
A. Is Targeted Killing Legal?
Targeted killing is legal, provided the state that conducts the
killing meets certain criteria. The brief for the plaintiff in Al-Aulaqi v.
Obama, prepared by the ACLU and the CCR, provides a restrictive
47. Ellen Nakashima, Intelligence Chief Acknowledges U.S. May Target Americans Involved
in Terrorism, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2010, at A3.
48. Declaration of Ben Wizner 3, A1-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010),
available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Wizner%20Declaration%20with%2OExhibits.pdf.
49. Nakashima, supra note 47.
50. Savage, supra note 1.
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view of the circumstances under which targeted killing is legal.51 The
position the ACLU and CCR took in this brief, which sought to
prevent a targeted killing, will be elaborated by reference to the
Report of the Special Rapporteur, which likewise chose a narrow view
of the permissibility of targeted killing.52 Together, these will provide
the ceiling on requirements for a legal targeted killing.
B. International Humanitarian Law
IHL is the law of armed conflicts. Targeted killing will often
take place during armed conflicts. Neither the ACLU nor the
Rapporteur considers armed conflict a necessary antecedent for
targeted killing.53 However, the presence of an armed conflict will
lower the bar for other requirements because the presence of an armed
conflict brings the killing under the IHL regime, which has relatively
more permissible standards for killing than HRL regardless of
whether there is an armed conflict of an international nature.54
For purposes of targeted killing and humanitarian law
generally, armed conflict has a precise definition that excludes many
violent "armed conflicts" in the colloquial sense. 55 The key threshold
determination is the level of violence, which cannot be merely isolated
or sporadic.56
Two circumstances that automatically create an armed conflict
are (1) violence between states, specifically between the "High
Contracting Parties" of the Geneva Conventions, and (2) violence
meeting the threshold set out in Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, specifically for armed conflict not of an international
character. 57 The ACLU advocates for a narrow definition of armed
conflict, including only regions controlled by the adversary. In the
51. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 10-16, Al-
Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010), available at http://ccrjustice.org/
files/PI%20Motion.pdf.
52. Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 13, 47-51.
53. Id.; Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, supra
note 51, at 2.
54. Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 13, 47-51; Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, supra note 51, at 2.
55. See Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 13, 47-51 (discussing the
distinction between international armed conflict and noninternational armed conflict).
56. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, 562 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997); Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 13, 47-
51.
57. Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 13, 47-51.
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context of the current War on Terror, the ACLU position is that Iraq
and Afghanistan would qualify as areas of armed conflict, but that
areas like Yemen and Somalia would not.
The United States considers Yemen, Somalia, and similar
areas to be permissible areas for targeted killing.58 The United States
thus takes the broader position that armed conflict extends wherever
the participants go. This approach has intuitive appeal. The ACLU
position, by contrast, creates geographically defined safe havens for
terrorists.
C. Combatancy: Who Has the Right to Kill and Who May Be Killed?
"Combatant" is a term of art.59 The standard definition of a
combatant comes from the Geneva Conventions' qualifications for
becoming a prisoner of war. 60 Combatants are either members of the
armed forces of a state party to the conflict or part of an armed group
under responsible command, wearing fixed distinctive insignia,
carrying their arms openly, and conducting their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war.61 Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions, to which the United States is not a party, dilutes
the fixed-insignia requirement. 62 It requires individuals only "to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are
engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an
attack" when possible and when not, merely to carry their arms
openly. 63 Despite a majority of countries accepting these provisions,
58. See Eli Lake, Dozens from U.S. Believed to Have Joined Terrorists: Threat Called
'Worrisome,' WASH. TIMES, June 25, 2010, at Al (quoting Deputy National Security Advisor for
Homeland Security John 0. Brennan saying, "If a person is a U.S. citizen, and he is on the
battlefield in Afghanistan or Iraq trying to attack our troops, he will face the full brunt of the
U.S. military response .... If an American person or citizen is in a Yemen [sic] or in a Pakistan
[sic] or in Somalia or another place, and they [sic] are trying to carry out attacks against U.S.
interests, they also will face the full brunt of a U.S. response. And it can take many forms.").
59. Many hypertechnical distinctions can influence the determination of a person or group's
combatant status and the type of law that applies. See Kretzmer, supra note 11, at 191.
60. Benjamin J. Priester, Return of the Great Writ: Judicial Review, Due Process, and the
Detention of Alleged Terrorists as Enemy Combatants, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 39, 49 (2005); see also
Geneva Conventions (1II) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (providing the definition) [hereinafter Geneva Conventions III].
61. Geneva Conventions III, supra note 60, art. 4(A)(1)-(2).
62. See Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 44, 3 (describing conditions under which combatants
may be released from the obligation to "distinguish themselves from the civilian population").
63. Id.
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the provisions do not rise to the level of customary international law. 64
Therefore, because the United States is not a party, Protocol I does not
affect U.S. law.65
Combatants engage in armed conflict. By virtue of their status,
lawful combatants can legally kill and be killed by other lawful
combatants. 66 It is never lawful to target and kill civilians. 67 When,
however, a person participates in an armed conflict, he ceases to be
simply a civilian; he becomes an unlawful combatant. 68 The converse,
however, is not true; when a combatant ceases active participation in
an armed conflict, he does not regain the status noncombatant
civilians enjoy.69 For example, when a soldier goes home on leave, he
64. Jus cogens norms supersede all treaties. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 ("A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law."). Jus cogens develop "[bly an
ancient usage among civilized nations . . . gradually ripening into a rule of international law."
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1900). Following the provisions in question is not a
settled practice among all the nations of the world, nor is it believed to be obligatory. Even
nations that ratified Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions do not necessarily believe in the
revolving-door combatancy envisioned by provisions allowing participants to remain combatants
only "for such time" as they participate in the armed conflict. Nations have opted not to include
the phrase "for such time" when distinguishing violence against civilians from violence against
belligerents, implying that an individual is either a civilian or a belligerent. Cf. Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter
Rome Statute] (omitting any reference to "for such time" from the definition of the crime of
violence against civilians). Finally, even if Protocol I or II could satisfy the objective requirement
that a heavy majority of States follow the practice and the subjective requirement that they do so
out of a sense of legal obligation, the U.S. would still be exempt as a persistent objector during
the creation of the norm.
65. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 269 (June 27) ("[Iun international law there are no rules, other than such rules as
may be accepted by the State concerned .. "); S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
10, at 18-19 (Sept. 7) (describing legal positivism as a fundamental principle of international
law).
66. The Supreme Court distinguished between lawful combatants, who capturing states
must afford prisoner of war status and eventually return to their home state despite having
killed, and other combatants in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-35 (1942) ("[T]he law of war
draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations
and also between those who are lawful and unlawful combatants."). It is illegal for an
unprivileged belligerent to kill a soldier. 32 C.F.R. § 11.6(b)(3)(ii) (2010).
67. Geneva Conventions III, supra note 60, art. 3(1)(a).
68. See United States v. Khadr, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1222 (C.M.C.R. 2007) (discussing the
difference between lawful and unlawful combatants); Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30-35 (describing how
an individual who participates in military action without wearing an armed forces uniform is an
unlawful combatant, there a spy); Bill Boothby, 'And for Such Time As " The Time Dimension to
Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 741, 754 (2010) ("[C]ivilians who
directly participate [in hostilities] do retain civilian status.") (citing Protocol I, supra note 12, art.
43).
69. See Khadr, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 1222 (permitting "civilian" unlawful combatants to be
captured and tried for their crimes).
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remains a lawful target.70 To hold otherwise allows for revolving-door
combatancy, making it lawful to target the combatant when he goes to
war in the morning but unlawful when he comes back home at night. 71
President Reagan opposed revolving-door combatancy because to
"grant combatant status to irregular forces even if they do not satisfy
the traditional requirements . . . . would endanger civilians among
whom terrorists and other irregulars attempt to conceal themselves." 72
Individuals cannot have legal combatant status by virtue of
membership in nonstate terrorist organizations.7 3 Soldiers who fight
for a state have "combatant immunity";74 that is, they are "privileged
belligerents" who may engage in hostilities without committing a
crime.7 5 Combatant immunity only exists in international armed
conflicts or in armed conflicts of a noninternational character where a
state is a participant. Individuals may still be legally privileged to kill
in situations of self-defense or a leve en masse.76 In the latter context,
for which the French Partisans are the archetype, the legal privilege
to kill comes from the state that the irregulars are fighting to
protect.7 7 Lawful combatants, and only lawful combatants, may kill
without committing a crime.78
70. See Boothby, supra note 68, at 754 (contrasting treaty protection of civilians with that
afforded "'members of organized armed groups' "); Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and
Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L.
511, 536 (2005) (stating "combatants may be attacked anywhere they are found outside neutral
territory," and giving the example of a soldier on leave).
71. See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 1124 (describing the difficulty of
determining when a civilian is a " 'direct participa[nt] in hostilities' "); Parks, supra note 26, at
118 (describing the "revolving door provided by Protocol I"); Schmitt, supra note 70, at 535.
72. Letter of Transmittal from Ronald Reagan, The White House to the Senate of the
United States (Jan. 29, 1987), reprinted in 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 910 (1987).
73. John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 207, 218 (2003).
74. See Crimes and Elements for Trials by Military Commission, 32 C.F.R. § 11.5(a) (2010)
("Under the law of armed conflict, only a lawful combatant enjoys 'combatant immunity' or
'belligerent privilege' for the lawful conduct of hostilities during armed conflict.").
75. 32 C.F.R. § 11.5(a) ("Combatant immunity. Under the law of armed conflict, only a
lawful combatant enjoys 'combatant immunity' or 'belligerent privilege' for the lawful conduct of
hostilities during armed conflict."); see Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-35 (1942).
76. See Geneva Conventions III, supra note 60, art. 4(a)(6).
77. See Michael A. Newton, Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a World United
Against Terrorism, 45 TEX. INT'L L.J. 323, 323, 337-40 (2009) (citing HUGO GROTIUS, 3 THE LAW
OF WAR AND PEACE ch. xiix (1625), available at http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/grotius/gro-
318.htm) (describing the evolution of combatant privilege from Rome to the modern era and the
linkage between combatancy and the State).
78. 32 C.F.R. § 11.5(a); see United States v. Khadr, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1221 (C.M.C.R.
2007) ("[L]awful combatants enjoy 'combatant immunity.' "); Keith A. Petty, Are You There,
Geneva? It's Me, Guantanamo, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 171, 174 (2009) (explaining that
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Individuals who do not conform to the Geneva Conventions or
the customary international definition of a soldier are unlawful
belligerents.79 States and privileged combatants may kill unlawful
belligerents in self-defense.80 Within the context of humanitarian law
and international criminal law, "combatant" only applies to a subset of
people who engage in combat. Terrorists are not legal combatants.81
Even those states that ratified Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions
recognize the legality of killing members of armed groups who are not
lawful combatants.8 2 Targeted killing therefore can be legal if
performed by a state against an individual who is actively engaged in
hostilities against that state. Neither geographic location nor
citizenship status8 3 is determinative of the permissibility of a targeted
killing under IHL.
D. Human Rights Law
Targeted killing raises human rights issues. HRL is the legal
regime generally applicable in all jurisdictions around the world.8 4 It
mandates that targeted killings only take place as a state's last
resort.8 5 Under HRL, the core of the last-resort element is that the
"lawful combatants enjoy combatant immunity and may not be prosecuted merely for taking part
in hostilities").
79. Petty, supra note 78 at 175; see Geneva Conventions III, supra note 60, art. 4(A)
(describing the prerequisites for being a prisoner of war).
80. U.N. Charter art. 51; see S.C. Res. 1368 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001)
("[riecognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the
Charter."); Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 1095 (explaining that al-Qaeda's actions in
the 1990s "triggered the right of the United States to use armed force in self-defense").
81. Terrorists likely fall under the statutory definition of "unprivileged enemy belligerent."
See 10 U.S.C.A. § 948a(7) (West 2011) (defining the term).
82. Protocol II, supra note 12, construed in International Committee of the Red Cross,
Commentary, Protocol II, 4789, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COMI475-
760019?OpenDocument ('Those who belong to armed forces or armed groups may be attacked at
any time.").
83. Even the ACLU concedes that a U.S. citizen who has taken up arms against the United
States on a battlefield or poses an imminent threat off of a battlefield can be killed outright. See
Frequently Asked Questions About Targeting Killing, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 30, 2010),
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/frequently-asked-questions-about.targeting-killing.
84. See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (July 12, 1993) (declaring that human
rights are universal and requiring that the international community treat them with the same
emphasis).
85. Michelle A. Hansen, Preventing the Emasculation of Warfare: Halting the Expansion of
Human Rights Law into Armed Conflict, 194 MIL. L. REV. 1, 56 (2007).
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killing be in self-defense.8 6 Arguably, a party can invoke self-defense
as a justification for killing in the "last window of opportunity" to
prevent unlawful violence.87 In the HRL context, a state may legally
use lethal force only when it is proportionate and necessary.88 For
lethal force to be necessary within this definition, the state first must
exhaust all feasible, nonlethal alternatives.8 9
There are certain minimum rights possessed universally at all
times by all people. The Geneva Convention Common Article 3
outlines these rights.90 Although it was born as a treaty among states,
so many states now observe it, and do so out of a sense of legal
obligation, that Common Article 3 is part of customary international
law, mandatory even for nonsignatories.91 Common Article 3 requires
that "[plersons taking no active part in the hostilities . . . shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely." 92 To that end, it specifically
prohibits "violence to life and person, in particular murder."93 It also
prohibits "the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples. 94
Targeted killings must be used either only against people
taking active part in the hostilities or only following judgment by a
86. Tony Rock, Yesterday's Laws, Tomorrow's Technology: The Laws of War and Unmanned
Warfare, 24 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 39, 54 (2011) (discussing the Caroline incident, which forms the
basis of many IHL arguments for preemptory self-defense).
87. Kretzmer, supra note 11, at 182. Kretzmer does not agree with this use of self-defense.
He views the immediacy of an attack as a necessary justification on evidentiary grounds as,
insofar as the attack is imminent, it is not necessary to prove that the suspected terrorist
actually constitutes a threat or that this is the last window of opportunity. In his view, allowing
the extrajudicial determination of when a suspect will commit an unlawful act of violence and
when the last window of opportunity is to prevent this violence with lethal force creates a
'limited exception" that swallows the rule. See generally id.
88. Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 13, 32.
89. Id.
90. Geneva Conventions III, supra note 60, art. 3. Article 3 is the same in Geneva
Conventions I-IV, hence "common article 3." Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
91. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700-08 (1900) (describing the process by which
law becomes customary international law).
92. Geneva Conventions III, supra note 60, art. 3(1).
93. Id. art. 3(1)(a).
94. Id. art. 3(1)(d).
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regularly constituted court affording all indispensable judicial
guarantees. The United States has opted to pursue the former course
of action, killing only people who take active part in hostilities. In this
manner, the targeted killing program can only survive as a military
operation.
E. Authorization for Use of Military Force
Military action by the United States ultimately requires
congressional authorization. On September 18, 2001, Congress passed
the Authorization for the Use of Military Force ("AUMF'), which
authorized the Global War on Terror.95 Congress acted in response to
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the World Trade
Center in New York City, the Pentagon outside Washington, D.C., and
United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed near Shanksville,
Pennsylvania.96 The sparse text of the bill authorizes the President to
''use all necessary and appropriate force ... to prevent any future acts
of international terrorism against the United States. ''97 The secret
OLC memo concluded that the AUMF authorized a strike against Al-
Aulaqi. 98
F. International Criminal Law
Targeted killing of American citizens by the U.S. government is
not a crime under International Criminal Law ("ICL"). The
International Criminal Court ("ICC"), established by the Rome
Statute of the ICC, is the primary international body with authority
over ICL. The United States is not a party to the Rome Statute.
Therefore, the ICC does not have jurisdiction over individual citizens
of the United States unless the United States decides to grant it that
jurisdiction, or the U.S. citizen is on the territory of a party to the
ICC. 99  Even where it has jurisdiction, its jurisdiction is
complementary, meaning that some other state also has jurisdiction
95. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001).
96. See, e.g., Sara Rimer & Jere Longman, After the Attacks: The Pennsylvania Crash;
Searchers Find Plane Cockpit Voice Recorder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2001, http:/www.
nytimes.com/2001/09/15/us/after-attacks-pennsylvania-crash-searchers-find-plane-cockpit-voice-
recorder.html.
97. Authorization for the Use of Military Force § (2)(a).
98. Savage, supra note 1.
99. Rome Statute, supra note 64, art. 12.
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over the case; that is, it must determine whether it should hear the
case, a consideration it calls "admissibility."100 Charges against U.S.
citizens in the ICC will be inadmissible. Even if the ICC obtained
jurisdiction over an American citizen, the ICC prosecutor can only
bring a case if every other party with jurisdiction, which in the case of
a U.S. citizen would always include the United States, was "unwilling
or unable genuinely" to investigate or prosecute the charge. 10' Because
of the U.S. network of agreements under Article 98 of the Statute,
which bars other states from sending U.S. citizens to the court without
U.S. consent, the ICC would have great difficulty physically obtaining
a U.S. citizen even if his case was admissible. 10 2 Further, targeted
killing as such is not a crime under the ICC statute. 0 3
G. Sovereignty Concerns
Because the United States conducts targeted killings in foreign
territories, issues of sovereignty arise. 0 4 The United States can
overcome these issues if either (a) the foreign state consents, 10 5 or (b)
the United States has the right to enter the state's territory and
conduct military operations there on other grounds.10 6 The self-defense
justification holds merit when the United States' response to an armed
attack is necessary and proportionate. 0 7 The United States can invoke
self-defense prior to an actual attack. 108
100. Id. art. 17.
101. Id. art. 17(1)(a).
102. Id. art. 98; see, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka Regarding the
Surrender of Persons to the International Criminal Court, U.S.-Sri Lanka, Nov. 22, 2002,
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/152450.pdf.
103. See Rome Statute, supra note 64, art. 5-9 (detailing the crimes under the statute).
104. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (banning Members from using force in the territory of
another state).
105. It appears that Yemen granted the United States permission to fire a missile in its
territory. Savage, supra note 1.
106. E.g., self-defense, U.N. Charter art. 51; at the behest of the Security Council exercising
its Chapter VII authority, etc. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT, AND COMMENTARIES 163 (2002).
107. U.N. Charter art. 51; Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 13, 39.
108. The United States has invoked preemptory self-defense before, most notably under the
Bush Administration. See GEORGE W. BUSH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002) (invoking self-defense as a justification for force even when
"uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack"). Preemptive self-defense in
American jurisprudence traces its roots back to the Caroline case and continues through to the
Bush doctrine, which does away with some of the imminence requirements traditionally
associated with preemptive self-defense, and on to the present day. Andrew S. Williams, The
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H. The ACLU's Wish List
Throughout its brief for the plaintiff in Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, the
ACLU declares that targeted killing is unlawful unless the target
poses a threat of death or serious physical injury that is "concrete,
specific, and imminent."'10 9 In support of its claim that the threat
should be concrete, specific, and imminent, the ACLU applies a
standard taken from domestic law enforcement. 110 The differences
between these cases and targeted killing are numerous. The
government actors are different: line law enforcement officers in the
cited cases as opposed to senior government officials in the case of
targeted killing."1 The suspects are different, too: common criminals
in the cited cases versus members of international terrorist
organizations. The crimes are also different: relatively minor
infractions like reckless driving in the cited cases as opposed to
treasonous terrorist operations. 112 Most importantly, the purpose of
killing is different. In the cited cases, the police may use lethal force to
protect themselves and others from the immediate threat that the
suspect poses and not from future operations that the suspect is
preparing. If the purpose is to protect the citizenry from an immediate
threat, but there is no immediate threat, then killing by domestic law
enforcement is not permissible. The purpose of a targeted killing is to
protect citizens from an attack that is being prepared, where waiting
until the threat is temporally immediate is not feasible.
The other cases the ACLU cited in support of its proposition,
that the threat should be concrete, specific, and imminent, deserve
even less weight than the domestic law enforcement cases it
mentioned. The remaining cases it cited are not only distinguishable,
but they also are not from U.S. courts and therefore have only limited
Interception of Civil Aircraft over the High Seas in the Global War on Terror, 59 A.F. L. REV. 73,
81-84 (2007).
109. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, supra note
51, at 2.
110. Id. at 13-14 (citing Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 550 (9th Cir. 2010)) ("Case law
has clearly established that an officer may not use deadly force to apprehend a suspect where the
suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer or others."); Cordova v. Aragon, 569 F.3d 1183,
1190 (10th Cir. 2009) (When an officer employs such a level of force that death is nearly certain,
he must do so based on more than the general dangers posed by reckless driving."); cf. Hundley
v. District of Columbia, 494 F.3d 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that jury could not find officer's
use of lethal force against a suspect reasonable in light of the jury's specific finding that the
suspect did not lunge at police officer in a threatening manner).
111. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, supra note
51, at 13-14.
112. Id. at 3-4, 14.
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persuasive authority.113 One problem with reasoning from foreign
cases to determine U.S. obligations is that, particularly with regard to
immediacy, two of the countries in the cited cases, Cyprus and Peru,
signed and ratified Protocol I, which contains an immediacy
requirement.1" 4 Protocol I is not part of U.S. law; therefore, the
immediacy requirement contained within it does not apply in the
United States.115 The foreign courts upheld their nations' treaty
obligations, which the United States does not share.
The OLC memo authorizing the killing of Al-Aulaqi opted to
stretch the definition of imminence to include risks posed by an enemy
leader who is in the business of attacking the United States whenever
possible, even if he is not in the midst of launching an attack when he
is found." 6 This definition tracks the idea of preemptory self-defense.
At first blush, it appears to do violence to the idea of imminence by
redefining it broadly enough to include attacks decades off. However,
when read with the OLC memo provision that only allows the
government to kill individuals it cannot capture, 1 7 the definition
limits the government to killing individuals who will attack the
United States before it is feasible to stop them in another way, which
is a less strained definition of imminence.
IV. U.S. CITIZENS DESERVE GREATER PROTECTION THAN NONCITIZENS
FROM TARGETED KILLING BY THE UNITED STATES
Just as Roman citizens could declare "Civis Romanus sum"118
anywhere throughout their world and know they retained the
protection of Rome, so too do U.S. citizens possess rights as citizens
113. Id. at 28 (citing Aytekin v. Turkey, App. No. 22880/93, Eur. Comm'n H.R., 95-96
(1997) (in the absence of specific circumstances justifying the fatal shooting of a suspect, finding
that "the fact that the area was subject to terrorist activity does not of its own accord give the
security forces the right to open fire upon people or persons that they deem suspicious"));
Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus, App. No. 25052/94, Eur. Ct. H.R., 191 (1997) (finding
that a fatal shooting was justified in light of a perceived "real and immediate danger" to life);
Neira-Alegria v. Peru, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 20, 74 (Jan. 19, 1995) (finding
that the actual danger under the circumstances did not justify the use of lethal force even where
the targets were "highly dangerous and 0 in fact armed").
114. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, State Parties / Signatories, Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsflWebSign?
ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
115. Id.; see also Part III.C supra.
116. See Savage, supra note 1.
117. Id.
118. 1 am a citizen of Rome.
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everywhere they go.119 The Bill of Rights applies extraterritorially. 120
The United States cannot strip its citizens of constitutional protection
merely because they are not present in the country. 121 It is an
extraordinary measure for the U.S. government to kill a U.S. citizen.
When the United States decides to kill one of its citizens far from an
area in which U.S. combat forces are active, the protections assured to
all citizens by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights must weigh
heavily, even if the target is actively participating in hostilities
against the United States. Americans must receive greater process
than non-Americans. 22
A. The Crime of Treason
When U.S. citizens take up arms against the United States, the
government traditionally prosecutes them for treason.123  The
expectation that the United States will have to deal with traitors has
a long history. It is one of only a very few substantive crimes
mentioned in the Constitution. 124  It has a well-established
jurisprudence stretching back to the Revolutionary War.' 25
The crime of treason is defined in Article III, section 3 of the
U.S. Constitution. It reads:
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in
adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted
of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on
119. See The West Wing: A Proportional Response (NBC television broadcast Oct. 6, 1999)
(Bartlet: "[A] Roman citizen could walk across the face of the known world . . . unharmed,
cloaked only in the protection of the words 'civis Romanus'-I am a Roman citizen. So great was
the retribution of Rome, universally understood as certain, should any harm befall even one of
its citizens .... [Where is the warning to the rest of the world that Americans shall walk this
Earth unharmed, lest the clenched fist of the most mighty military force in the history of
mankind comes crashing down on your house?").
120. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 270 (1990) ('[Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1 (1957),] decided that United States citizens stationed abroad could invoke the protection
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments."); In re 9 Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr.,
552 F.3d 157, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to
citizens abroad).
121. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) ("At the beginning we reject the idea that when the
United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights.").
122. Savage, supra note 1.
123. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Where the
Government accuses a citizen of waging war against it, our constitutional tradition has been to
prosecute him in federal court for treason or some other crime.").
124. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
125. See, e.g., Respublica v. Carlisle, 1 U.S. 35 (1778) (affirming the indictment of a citizen of
the Pennsylvania for assisting Great Britain in waging war against the Commonwealth).
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Confession in open Court. The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of
Treason .... 126
The Constitution also provides that treason will not "work Corruption
of Blood" and provides additional security from the government for the
descendants and relatives of the traitor.127
Because targeted individuals are engaged in a war against the
United States, any U.S. citizen on the targeted killing list, were he to
return to the United States, could stand accused of treason. Even the
nebulous criteria available for being added to the kill list-i.e., being
actively involved in operations against the United States-would
likely qualify as "levying War. . . or in adhering to [the] Enemies [of
the United States], giving them Aid and Comfort. ' 128 Applied to the
facts of the Anwar Al-Aulaqi case, A1-Aulaqi was, by his own words
and as demonstrated through his actions, levying war against the
United States. A1-Aulaqi advocated for, participated in, and recruited
others to participate in war. Because Al-Aulaqi was a citizen of the
United States, by participating in a war against the United States, Al-
Aulaqi was a traitor. Under the other qualification for treason, he was
not only an adherent to an enemy but also a leader within an enemy
organization, al-Qaeda. 129 In terms of giving the organization aid and
comfort, he had been one of its principal recruiters and scholars. He
was therefore a prime candidate for conviction of the crime of treason
if he had come back to the United States for trial. However, because
capture and trial were not feasible, President Barack Obama secretly
ordered U.S. forces to kill A1-Aulaqi in a drone strike. 130
B. U.S. Citizens Have the Right to a Trial When Accused of a Crime
Inescapable in the Constitution's definition of treason are the
stringent evidentiary requirements for conviction. The Constitution
requires that the accused traitor stand trial and be convicted by
competent evidence from at least two witnesses or a confession "in
open Court."'131 Overwhelming anecdotal evidence of traitorous
conduct is insufficient. Part IV.A indicated the seriousness with which
the framers treated an accusation of treason. The second evidentiary
126. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Rushe et al., supra note 1.
130. See Savage, supra note 1.
131. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
270 [Vol. 65:1:249
MY FELLOWAMERICANS
requirement of an in-court confession is important in the context of
vocal supporters of enemy regimes, because it means that their out-of-
court statements cannot be used as confessions sufficient for
conviction. Finally, relevant to the use of the "treason" framework to
justify targeted killing, the Constitution vests power in Congress to
designate the punishment for treason. 132 It does not vest the executive
with any power with regard to traitors save the power to execute laws,
which is already contained in the executive function. 133
If individuals on the targeted killing list peaceably surrendered
themselves to the United States to stand trial for treason, they would
be entitled to these protections. 34 The law protects citizens' rights and
safety if they choose to surrender. 135 If the government plans to treat a
citizen as a traitor, then the government must give the citizen notice
that he is wanted for the crime of treason. Without notice, the accused
lacks the opportunity to avail himself of his constitutional right to
stand trial before a jury of his peers. A targeted citizen's choice to
avail himself of the judicial system says nothing of his guilt or
innocence or his status as a suspected terrorist. 136 Forcing the accused
to face trial does not deprive him of his rights: "All U.S. citizens may
avail themselves of the U.S. judicial system if they present themselves
peacefully, and no U.S. citizen may simultaneously avail himself of
the U.S. judicial system and evade U.S. law enforcement
authorities."'137 Targeted killing is not punishment for treason. U.S.
citizens who serve as soldiers for the enemy can be shot without trial
during military operations but must be afforded a trial as traitors if
they can be captured. So too U.S. citizens who are leaders at the
strategic level for the enemy can be targeted and killed without trial
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. See U.S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIV (guaranteeing freedom from excessive bail, fines,
and cruel and unusual punishment by both federal and state governments); Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) ("A prison official's 'deliberate indifference' to a substantial risk of
serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment." (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509
U.S. 25 (1993); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976))); McKinney, 509 U.S. at 32
("[c]ontemporary standards" require that prison conditions receive scrutiny under the Eighth
Amendment (citing Gamble, 429 U.S. at 103-104)); Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104 ("[Djeliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain' proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 173 (1976)); Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff stated a cause
of action under the Fourteenth Amendment by alleging that prison guards had knowingly
allowed him to be placed in a cell with a violent, mentally unstable inmate).
136. A1-Aulaqi v. United States, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17-18 (D.D.C. 2010).
137. Id. at 18.
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during military operations but must be afforded a trial as traitors if
they can be captured. Targeted killing is not a punishment for a crime
but a military operation. The difference between killing a U.S. citizen
soldier in enemy ranks during battle and killing a leader of the enemy
in a targeted strike is one of personal specificity. In the context of
killing a soldier of the enemy, the individual U.S. soldier does not
know that he is firing at a U.S. citizen traitor in the ranks of the
enemy; the U.S. citizen traitor is killed in the heat of battle, as are so
many other enemy soldiers. For this manner of killing a traitor, prior
notice is not a requirement. If the U.S. armed forces conducts a
military operation in an area that will kill enemy soldiers, no special
precautions must be taken to ensure that the U.S. citizen traitor is not
killed alongside his adopted countrymen. But in the case of a targeted
killing, senior executive branch officials explicitly designate one U.S.
citizen as a target and attempt to kill him specifically outside of a
standard battle. The result is that the U.S. citizen needs to be on
notice that he stands suspected of being a traitor or of committing
some other crime. If he is given this information, he can make the
choice either to surrender himself to the United States, stand trial,
and possibly clear his name or to continue to fight and die with the
enemies of the United States.
For example, before the United States killed him, Al-Aulaqi
should have been given notice that he was wanted for treason, or
another crime, and that if he refused to return and stand trial, then he
would be considered a military target. Functionally, A1-Aulaqi had
notice that he was on a kill list. The media had been abuzz about
killing him, and his father even filed an unsuccessful lawsuit on his
behalf.138 Nonetheless, he did not return to the United States for trial.
All citizens have the constitutional right to a jury trial in
criminal cases.139 For traitors who stand accused of committing crimes
138. See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1; Times Topics: Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
11, 2011, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/a/anwar-aLawlaki/
index.html (providing a biography of and listing eighty articles on AJ-Aulaqi); Spencer S. Hsu,
U.S. Officials Defend 'State Secrets' Claim in al-Aulaqi Suit, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2010,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/25/
AR2010092503089.html; Kenneth Anderson, Judge Dismisses Al-Aulaqi Targeted Killing Case,
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 7, 2010, 11:13 AM), http:lvolokh.com/2OlOl2/07/judge-
dismisses-al-aulaqi-targeted-killing-case/; Chez Pazienza, Killing an Arab-American: The Debate
over Anwar al-Aulaqi, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 28, 2010, 1:10 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/chez-pazienza/anwar-al-aulaqi-debate_b_741830.html.
139. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes .. .shall be held in the State
where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the
Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.").
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that physically touched the United States, their trials will be held
where they committed their crimes. 140 But in the case of terrorists who
are still in the planning stages of launching a strike, or who commit a
crime against the United States outside of the territorial bounds of the
United States, Congress can direct where the trial ought to take
place.' 41 The guarantee of a jury trial is a protection available if the
designated individual decides to avail himself of it. With regard to
targeted killings, the Constitution, however, does not demand that a
person who is a military threat to the United States remain at large
because he is good at avoiding arrest.
C. Notice
An underlying element of all law is the principle of nullem
crimen sine lege, or "no crime without law." One purpose of law is to
make people aware of what conduct is permissible and what is not.
U.S. citizens have a right to know what conduct will get them killed by
their government. Currently, the United States does not publish the
criteria it uses to decide who will be killed by targeted killing, beyond
statements like that of then Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center, Michael Leiter, who stated, "Individuals aren't targeted
because they have bad ideas. Individuals aren't targeted because they
inspire others to do things. Individuals are targeted because they are
involved in operations targeting the United States and our
homeland."142 Nor, for that matter, does the United States publish the
list of U.S. citizens who it intends to kill. 143 The result is that the
United States can use secret criteria to secretly designate U.S.
citizens, secretly kill them, and officially deny any involvement in the
action.144
These unpublished "kill lists" or other means of designating
individuals for targeted killing should not be confused with the U.S.
Treasury Department's published lists of Specially Designated Global
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Michael Leiter, Dir., Nat'l Counterterrorism Ctr., Address to the Aspen Institute: The
Terror Threat and Picture and Counterterrorism Strategy (June 30, 2010) (transcript available
at http://www.nctc.gov/press-roonspeeches/eiter-transcripLaspen-institute06301.pdf); see
also Savage, supra note 1.




Terrorist ("SDGT") individuals, which are available to the public. 145
While Al-Aulaqi was on both an SDGT list146 and a kill list, the two
lists are not necessarily the same. It is not known, for example,
whether Aqeel Abdulaziz al-Aqil or Chiheb Ben Mohamed Ben Moktar
al-Ayari, the SDGT individuals listed immediately before and after Al-
Aulaqi, are also subject to targeted killing. 147 Even after the United
States killed Al-Aulaqi, it did not publicly acknowledge his presence
on a kill list.148
Military expedience and security arguments support the
practice of nonpublication of the lists. If the targets know that they
have been designated, then they will make it more difficult, more
expensive, and more dangerous for our armed forces to kill them.
Notifying the targets will also make continued intelligence gathering
more difficult.
Fundamental justice arguments support publication. All people
have rights to life and liberty unless their government deprives them
of those rights through the due process of law. Because the U.S.
government can freeze the assets of SDGT individuals, they already
have serious financial incentives to challenge their designations or
otherwise exercise their rights in U.S. courts. Many have opted not to
do so. But regardless of whether any individuals on kill lists decide to
exercise their rights in court, it is still important to provide notice
because it is a fundamental principle of our justice system.1 49
145. Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, http://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/t1lsdn.pdf (last
visited Oct. 30, 2011) ("AL-AULAQI, Anwar (a.k.a. AL-AWLAKI, Anwar; a.k.a. AL-AWLAQI,
Anwar; a.k.a. AULAQI, Anwar Nasser; a.k.a. AULAQI, Anwar Nasser Abdulla; a.k.a. AULAQI,
Anwar Nasswer); DOB 21 Apr 1971; alt. DOB 22 Apr 1971; POB Las Cruces, New Mexico; citizen
United States; alt. citizen Yemen (individual) [SDGT] 7-16-10").
146. Id. ("AL-AULAQI, Anwar (a.k.a. AL-AWLAKI, Anwar; a.k.a. AL-AWLAQI, Anwar;
a.k.a. AULAQI, Anwar Nasser; a.k.a. AULAQI, Anwar Nasser Abdulla; a.k.a. AULAQI, Anwar
Nasswer); DOB 21 Apr 1971; alt. DOB 22 Apr 1971; POB Las Cruces, New Mexico; citizen
United States; alt. citizen Yemen (individual) [SDGT] 7-16-10').
147. Id. Neither A1-Aqil nor Al-Ayari is a U.S. citizen.
148. See Savage, supra note 1.
149. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) ("Many
controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but
there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty, or
property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the




The U.S. Constitution protects all American citizens from
abuses by the U.S. government. These constitutional protections take
the form of explicitly guaranteed rights, limits to the power of the
federal government, and checks on government power through the
structure of the government. American citizens carry these rights with
them regardless of where they go or of what they stand suspected or
accused. 150
1. Due Process
Due process comes in two varieties-substantive and
procedural. Of concern here is procedural due process; that is, the
procedures that the government must follow before depriving a citizen
of his right to life. In the context of targeted killing, the decision to kill
an individual American citizen will ultimately fall on an agency, such
as the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"). 151 When an agency makes
a binding decision on the rights of a particular party by reference to
historical facts, 152 it is conducting an adjudication. 153
The U.S. Supreme Court articulated the standard for
evaluating agency compliance with procedural due process in Mathews
v. Eldridge.154 The Court has not formally applied Eldridge to targeted
killing-it has not yet heard a case concerning targeted killing-but
its reasoning in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld suggests that the Eldridge test
would also apply to a targeted killing case. 155 Eldridge concerned the
150. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) ("At the beginning we reject the idea that when the
United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights.").
151. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 597 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing a
2002 killing, by the CIA, of a U.S. citizen who was an al-Qaeda leader).
152. Historical here means the same as "adjudicative," as opposed to "legislative." It should
not be taken to imply the type of facts found in dusty volumes on library shelves, but rather,
those of the type used at trial.
153. Compare Londoner v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908) (providing
the rationale for agency adjudications in requiring a due process hearing when assessing a new
road-paving tax that would be levied on just a few landholders), with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (making the pragmatic distinction between adjudication
and rulemaking and distinguishing from Londoner on the grounds that a new tax would be
levied across all citizens equally, making a hearing unnecessary).
154. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 355 (1976).
155. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-29 ("The ordinary mechanism that we use for balancing such
serious competing interests, and for determining the procedures that are necessary to ensure
that a citizen is not 'deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,' U.S. Const.,
Amdt. 5, is the test that we articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge."). Justice Thomas, in his dissent,
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termination of Social Security disability benefits. 156 While some
members of the Court have maligned expanding a test created for
adjudicating disability payments to cases adjudicating the most basic
rights of terrorists engaged in combat against the United States, the
Court has nonetheless specifically named Eldridge as the standard. 157
The famous Eldridge standard is a three-part balancing test.158 First,
a court will consider the private interest that will be affected by the
official action.159 Second, it will consider the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards.1 60 Third, it will consider the government's interests,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements
would entail.161
Applying the Eldridge standard to the presumable 16 2
procedures the government uses for selecting targets, this Note
concludes that those procedures fall short. The private interest at
stake here is the life of an American citizen. The risk of erroneous
deprivation of that right is difficult to determine because the
procedures the government uses are secret. The political ramifications
of engaging in a targeted killing are such that the killings should not
be undertaken haphazardly or without consideration of the available
evidence. Similarly, the targets are such that the association of a
target with a terrorist organization should be abundantly clear. The
difficulty lies in the determination of whether killing the target would
prevent future attacks against the United States. Intelligence data,
even the best, upon which the President and top advisors rely to make
worried that the plurality's decision "would seem to require notice and opportunity to respond [in
a case of targeted killing] as well." Id. at 597 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
156. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
157. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-29; see also id. at 575 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[The
Court] claims authority to engage in this sort of 'judicious balancing' from Mathews v. Eldridge,.
a case involving... the withdrawal of disability benefitsf').
158. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. Eldridge is not the appropriate test for evaluating the validity of state procedural
rules that are part of a criminal process. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 442-43 (1992).
Targeted killing is not part of a criminal process. See supra Part II.D (differentiating targeted
killing from assassinations and execution).
162. The actual procedures being used have not been disclosed in detail, but it is possible to
make educated guesses based on the facts disclosed in Savage, supra note 1.
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the most critical decisions of U.S. defense policy, is still a dicey
business.163
With the risk of making an error being what it is, we must now
consider whether there are additional or substitute procedures that
would produce more reliable evidence. 164 Trial by jury is no doubt the
best protection that the government can provide to avoid erroneous
deprivation of a right, but not all deprivations require trial-like
procedures. 165 In a trial-like procedure, the suspected terrorist would
be able to present written and oral arguments, have access to the
evidence the state plans to use against him, be able to cross-examine
the witnesses against him, and be able to prevent the inclusion of
much hearsay evidence. The government is amicable to this sort of
procedure.1 66 The suspect need only turn himself in.167
A trial in absentia would be incredibly costly, in terms of the
expenditure of state resources and in terms of the opportunity cost of
not attacking the target when expedient. Likewise, a trial in absentia
would provide little additional benefit to the target as the witnesses
and information at his disposal would remain with him. Even
providing evidence with which to conduct a trial or a trial-like
proceeding presents grave issues implicating the state secrets
doctrine. The Totten bar bans adjudication in court of any matter
where the subject matter of the case is itself a state secret.168 Here, as
evidenced by the government's refusal to disclose whether these
programs in fact exist, the programs are a state secret. Even if the
state's targeted killing program were fully disclosed, the Reynolds bar
prevents any evidence that is itself a state secret from being admitted
in court.1 69 Thus, an Article III-style trial will have greatly limited
access to evidence as compared with an agency's initial determination,
163. See, e.g., Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74, 79 (D.D.C. 2007) (describing the
intelligence failures that led the George W. Bush White House to believe erroneously that Iraq
possessed weapons of mass destruction), aff'd, 535 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2008). It is unlikely the
government would do a more thorough intelligence analysis to launch a single strike than it did
to launch a war.
164. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990) (examining the value of
predeprivation hearings).
165. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987) (discussing how statutory
actions similar to 18th century actions in English courts before the merger of the courts of equity
and law may not require jury trials).
166. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 32 (D.D.C. 2010).
167. Id.
168. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(citing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876)).
169. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953).
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making an erroneous conclusion at trial more likely than one at the
agency level.
Finally, the government interest at stake is the defense of the
country. Weighing against the definite deprivation of life of one U.S.
citizen is the potential deprivation of life of many U.S. citizens. The
cost of providing many of the additional procedures would be high.
The time required to conduct a proper trial on the merits in absentia
or even to give judicial review to judges prior to taking action would
impose impracticable time costs. The cost-benefit analysis of providing
additional procedures thus likely fails.
While the Court has not formally applied the Eldridge
standard to a case of targeted killing, Justice Thomas, in his dissent in
Hamdi, does so in dicta. 170 Justice Thomas and this Note reach the
same conclusion regarding the current state of the law under the
plurality's standard: the United States must give individuals notice
before killing them.171 Justice Thomas reads the plurality decision in
Hamdi to apply to other military operations central to war making. 72
He says, "Because a decision to bomb a particular target might
extinguish life interests, the plurality's analysis seems to require
notice to potential targets.' ' 73 Justice Thomas goes on to describe the
situation that this Note uses as its introduction. The CIA targeted a
U.S. citizen who was an al-Qaeda leader and four others driving down
a road in Yemen. The CIA launched a Predator drone, and the
Predator drone launched a Hellfire missile. Justice Thomas states,
"[T]he plurality's due process would seem to require notice and
opportunity to respond here as well."' 74 While Justice Thomas dislikes
the current state of the law, he correctly recognizes that this is the
current state of the law. Should the case come before the Court, he
could dissent again.
170. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 597 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
171. Id. It is worth noting that Justice Thomas considers giving targets notice a bad idea.




174. Id. Thomas does not think that the plurality desires this result or that they would
require notice and opportunity to respond in this situation. Id. However, it is fair to assume that
the plurality was aware of Justice Thomas's concerns and decided against him.
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2. Amendment IV: Seizure of the Target's Life
Targeted killing implicates the Seizure Clause of the Fourth
Amendment because "apprehension by the use of deadly force is a
seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment."'175 In its analysis of the Tennessee v. Garner case, the
Supreme Court determined that the reasonableness inquiry must
balance the threat the suspect posed to the public with the suspect's
interest in his life. 176 Garner involved a domestic arrest by police
forces and is distinguishable from targeted killing on those grounds. 177
However, targeted killing is susceptible to review under this domestic
standard, and it is not yet clear what standard the Court will choose
in the final analysis of targeted killing. The rules imposed upon
domestic law enforcement when apprehending dangerous criminals at
home have implicit appeal because we can view terrorists as
dangerous criminals abroad that the United States wishes to
apprehend. While in Part III.H this Note cites reasons why the
domestic law enforcement model is not particularly well suited to the
targeted killing context, the Court may still adopt a domestic law
enforcement model, so its implications deserve examination. The
domestic law enforcement regime has additional relevance because it
is a comprehensive and thoroughly reviewed system dealing with
criminal U.S. citizens. By contrast, procedures for determining the
permissibility of strictly military strikes are designed not with a view
toward attacking criminals or U.S. citizens but rather with a view
toward attacking the lawful combatants of other states.
Should the Court adopt a domestic law enforcement framework
for analysis of the seizure component of targeted killing, the practice
will be permissible in some circumstances but not as a carte blanche
policy of extrajudicial killing. In Garner, the Court rejected a
Tennessee law making it permissible for police officers to use lethal
force to apprehend any suspected felon whom the police have notified
that they intend to arrest and who subsequently flees. 178
Cases arising out of the famed Ruby Ridge standoff between
FBI agents and anti-U.S. government U.S. citizens in Idaho and the
siege of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, help bring the
current jurisprudence on lethal apprehension of U.S. citizens into
175. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 3.
178. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982); Garner, 471 U.S. at 4, 11.
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focus. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled
unconstitutional the rules of engagement at Ruby Ridge that
permitted the FBI to shoot armed adult males in the area. 179
Specifically, the court took issue with the blanket attack, the ability of
federal agents to kill without warning, and the absence of a
requirement that the suspect pose an immediate threat to the agents
or to the public. 8 0 The Ninth Circuit considered the permitted killings
of suspects who did not pose an immediate threat to be "wartime
rules" and held that they were "patently unconstitutional in a police
action."l8'
Read together, these rulings stand for a peacetime ban on carte
blanche killing of members of any class of suspects determined
exclusively by reference to external characteristics. The hallmark of
the courts' analyses of domestic use of lethal force against U.S.
citizens is the "reasonableness" balancing test espoused in Garner.182
Determining whether the force used to effect a seizure is reasonable
balances the nature and quality of the intrusion, the person's Fourth
Amendment rights, and the government interests at stake. 183 The
inquiry embraces the "totality of the circumstances."' 84
Targeted killings, by and large, should pass this inquiry.
Targeted killings are executive-branch decisions to seize a particular
suspect through lethal force. Whereas the Garner and Horiuchi lines
of cases ban directives authorizing the killings of whole classes of
suspects, targeted killings examine the totality of the circumstances
with respect to a particular individual suspect. 8 5 Targeted killing
keeps the decision in the hands of senior members of the executive
branch and out of the hands of lower-level law enforcement agents. In
a targeted killing, senior members of the executive branch choose to
strike a specific individual and then junior members carry out the
operation.
A separate string of cases guarantees certain minimum
conditions precedent for the seizure of suspected terrorists under the
Fourth Amendment. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court held that a U.S.
citizen captured in combat in Afghanistan, where the United States is
179. Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1997).
180. Id. at 1201-04.
181. Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359, 377 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Kozinski, J.), vacated as
moot, 266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001).
182. Garner, 471 U.S. at 7-8.
183. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 8).
184. Garner, 471 U.S. at 9.
185. Id. at 11; Horiuchi, 253 F.3d at 377.
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currently fighting a war, still possessed basic constitutional rights. 8 6
The facts of Hamdi present the ideal alternative situation to targeted
killing. There, the U.S. citizen was not targeted for killing but rather
was captured in the field.18 7 That the capture occurred during combat
in a territory in which the United States was actively engaged in
hostilities also allows Hamdi to skirt some of the thornier issues
surrounding the targeted killing of people like AJ-Aulaqi, who are not
engaged in combat and who reside outside of the geographic regions of
active hostility.88 Under Eldridge, Hamdi's interest in his liberty was
less important than AI-Aulaqi's interest in his life.189 The
government's interest in "eliminating" a terrorist remains the same
because, whether killed or captured, the target is no longer a threat.
Therefore, any protections guaranteed to Hamdi will likely also extend
to citizens like Al-Aulaqi that the government intends to kill.
Hamdi guaranteed suspects the right to be put on notice and
an opportunity to be heard by a neutral decisionmaker regarding the
reasons for the government's decision for apprehension. 90 Hamdi and
others like him could exercise these rights after their arrests. In the
context of targeted killing, however, the accused must be afforded the
opportunity to exercise these rights prior to the state action.1 91 This is
a relatively low hurdle for the government to overcome, given the
severity of the deprivation of rights that it seeks to impose. The hurdle
reflects a deliberate balancing of the rights of the individual and the
interests of the government. 192 All that would be required is that the
government make reasonable efforts to put the accused on notice that
he is wanted for trial and afford him a neutral decisionmaker should
186. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (plurality opinion) (holding that due
process requires a citizen-detainee to receive notice of the factual basis for his classification as an
enemy combatant and a fair opportunity to rebut that factual basis before a neutral
decisionmaker).
187. Id. at 510.
188. See id. at 514 (explaining that the Fourth Circuit stressed that, because Hamdi was
captured in a zone of active combat, "no factual inquiry or evidentiary hearing allowing Hamdi to
be heard or to rebut the Government's assertions was necessary or proper").
189. See supra Part IV.D. 1.
190. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
191. See id. at 597 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the potential for extinguishing life
interests would require notice to a bombing target).
192. Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (establishing the standard for




he come forward. 193 Hamdi speaks of notice and an opportunity to be
heard by a neutral decisionmaker, not an actual hearing. 194 The
suspect therefore needs notice but does not necessarily need a prior
review by a neutral decisionmaker under the Hamdi guidelines. 195 All
targets should receive notice. If a suspect surrenders himself or is
otherwise captured, then he receives a hearing. All targets should
receive the opportunity for a hearing. Once they have received both, it
is up to the individual target whether to avail himself of that
opportunity.
3. Amendment V: Right Not to Be Deprived of Life Without Due
Process
The U.S. government cannot simply kill an American citizen
out of hand. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution contains
within it a due process requirement that requires the government to
follow adequate procedures before depriving a citizen of a weighty
right. 196 That requirement is applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. 197 The Fifth Amendment states that "[n]o
person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."'198 The Due Process Clause extends outside of the
boundaries of criminal trials.199 Due process is required whenever an
individual will be deprived of life, liberty, or property. 200 For targeted
killing then, a targeted U.S. citizen must be afforded some process
before the government kills him. This process is not spelled out in the
text of the Constitution, but it does not necessarily include a trial
before an Article III court. 201
The precedents from the War on Terror cases are instructive as
to the kinds of process due to those targeted for killing. In Hamdi, the
Court held that the Due Process Clause protects U.S. citizens
193. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 597 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plurality's
requirements of notice and the opportunity to be heard by a neutral decisionmaker for citizen-
detainees would apply to other military operations such as bombing a target).
194. Id. at 533 (plurality opinion).
195. See id.
196. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
197. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
198. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
199. See, e.g., Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 323 (applying the due process in the context of
government deprivation of an individual's social security disability benefits).
200. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
201. See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335 (describing the factors that determine how much process
the Fifth Amendment requires).
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captured on the battlefield in open and violent opposition to the
United States.20 2 The swaying political opinions of the executive
branch, and the foreign policy decisions of the commander-in-chief,
cannot justly dictate whether a U.S. citizen will live or die. 20 3 Certain
rights, such as the right to life, are set apart from other state
processes and subject to infringement only after the state observes
formal processes. 20 4 The U.S. government cannot infringe on a
fundamental liberty interest at all "unless the infringement is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 2 5
In the situation of a targeted killing, the government's
infringement on the target's interest is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest. The government defines the target and
takes action to protect the rest of the citizens of the United States
from an attack by one particular citizen. The government still needs to
disclose a process for determining who it will kill and why it can kill
them that can survive strict scrutiny.
4. Amendment VI: Beyond a Trial
One right that seems especially cogent in the targeted killing
context is the right of the accused "to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense." 20 6 Though these rights are constitutionally
guaranteed only "in all criminal prosecutions,"' 20 7 they would certainly
provide additional safeguards for the rights of targeted U.S. citizens
from overzealous military commanders. The adversarial process
employed in law enforcement has the same merit with regard to
making accurate determinations when applied to decisions by agencies
and military commanders to target and kill an individual. And, unlike
in the more traditional battlefield context where the commander
cannot afford to waste time with such "micromanaging" by judicial
process, a targeted killing is subject to a more deliberative process.
202. 542 U.S. 507, 532-33 (2004) (plurality opinion).
203. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (explaining that the
purpose of the Bill of Rights was to remove certain subjects from the reach of majorities, officials,
and political controversies).
204. Id. ("One's right to life... may not be submitted to vote; [it] depend[sj on the outcome of
no elections.").
205. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); see also Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499,
508-09 (2005) (applying strict scrutiny to prison determinations of cell selection based on race).




The closest analogy to targeted killing is targeted bombings of
structures and enemy facilities. Strikes of this nature raise issues of
humanitarian law and domestic law.208 The Judge Advocate Generals
("JAGs") of the various military branches advise commanders on the
legality of a strike. JAGs are already in place in the military command
structure, and they could equally advise commanders on the legality of
ordering a particular targeted killing. With regard to the targeted
killing of non-U.S. citizens, it would seem that the structure in place
for advising commanders of the legality of targeting an enemy facility
(which often contains many people) is sufficient for the targeting and
killing of a single individual.
However, the United States should provide more protection to
American citizens than to foreign citizens. The JAG Corps could still
provide this function, but the Sixth Amendment guarantees of access
to counsel and compulsory process for obtaining witnesses (or at least
evidence) in favor of the target seem especially important here. Once
JAG officers make their cases before a neutral decisionmaker for the
legality or illegality of killing the target, the commander would then
have the authority to decide, with the advice of the JAG Corps,
whether the military objective served justified conducting the targeted
killing.
5. Amendment VIII: Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment protects citizens from cruel and
unusual punishment.20 9 To date, the Court has not concluded that
death is a cruel and unusual punishment. 210 Although Part II.D cites
reasons targeted killing should not be considered a "punishment," the
protection against cruel and unusual punishment still applies to these
killings. The jurisprudence of the Court has found that the protection
against cruel and unusual punishment extends to practices that are
arbitrary and capricious and that deprive the individual in question of
his life.211 The Court's finding that capital punishment was imposed in
208. See, e.g., Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex,
supra note 38, § II, arts. 22, 25 (stipulating that belligerents do not have an unlimited right to
adopt measures to injure the enemy and prohibiting the attack or bombardment of undefended
towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings).
209. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
210. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also Baze v. Rees, 553
U.S. 35, 41 (2008) (plurality opinion) (affirming that death is not itself a cruel and unusual
punishment).
211. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (banning the
death penalty where it was applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner); Rachel E. Barkow,
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a manner that was arbitrary and capricious led it to put a moratorium
on executions in 1972.212 Under such reasoning, the Court would likely
take a similar view of the targeted killing program if it is found to be
arbitrary and capricious in its application. This is another argument
in favor of a steady and known process of determining and reviewing
targets. If targeted killing is to continue as a process, then the
government must ensure that the agencies making these decisions
follow procedures that can sustain judicial scrutiny under the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard.
6. Judicial Review of Executive Decisions and Separation of Powers
Finally, there are additional protections for the citizens of the
United States coming out of the very structure of the U.S.
government. The executive is at its most powerful when working in
the sphere of foreign relations, particularly when working in military
operations. 213 The district court opinion in the Al-Aulaqi case raises
the question of whether AI-Aulaqi would have the right to sue for an
injunction preventing him from being targeted and killed.214 The
United States cannot be sued without its consent because of sovereign
immunity. 215 The United States must waive sovereign immunity
explicitly to give rise to a private action, as all purported waivers of
sovereign immunity are strictly construed. 216 The Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") provides a waiver of sovereign immunity in
actions against federal government agencies for nonmonetary relief.217
Nonetheless, the judiciary maintains the power to review executive
The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for
Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1151 (2009) ("When the Supreme Court struck down capital
punishment as it then existed in 1972 in Furman v. Georgia, its central concern was avoiding
arbitrary and capricious death sentences.").
212. Furman, 408 U.S. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring).
213. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 691-92 (1952) (Vinson, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the constitutional provisions designating the President as
representative in foreign relations and commander of the military authorize him to act for the
national protection, even absent specific constitutional provisions or enactments of Congress
allowing that action).
214. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 35 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing Al-Aulaqi's
father's request for an injunction due to lack of standing).
215. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) ("The United States, as sovereign,
is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued."); see United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4
(1969) (finding that the Court of Claims' jurisdiction to grant relief depends on whether the
United States has waived its sovereign immunity, and that the waiver must be unequivocally
expressed and not implied).
216. King, 395 U.S. at 3.
217. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
branch decisions made in the exercise of its war powers if the
decisions infringe constitutionally protected rights.218
This Section also presents, as noted by the district court, an
issue of justiciability that may preclude any ex post review by Article
III courts. The district court considered the military matter of targeted
killing to be a political question, beyond the scope of its review
powers. 219 Military action is textually committed by the Constitution
to the political branches of the U.S. government. 220 This textual
commitment is likely sufficient for a court to find that the targeted
killing program is a nonjusticiable political question.221
Review of targeted killing decisions does not necessarily have
to come from an Article III court. The legislature, with some
exceptions, 222 can decide what cases will or will not be heard and by
whom the cases will be heard. 223 In his opinion dismissing the Al-
Aulaqi case for lack of standing, Judge Bates stated his concern about
making targeted killing decisions effectively unreviewable by the
judiciary, stating, "How is it that judicial approval is required when
the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for
electronic surveillance, but that . . . judicial scrutiny is prohibited
when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for
death? 224  The reason for this is that search and seizure is
218. Kovach v. Middendorf, 424 F. Supp. 72, 77 (D. Del. 1976) (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 164-165 (1963)); cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166, 177
(1803) (stating that when the law assigns a duty to an executive official, unlike when they are
exercising executive discretion, a person who considers themselves injured has the right to resort
to the laws of the country for a remedy and "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is").
219. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 52.
220. Id. at 48 (citing Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 194-95 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
221. See id. at 44-45 (stating that for a case to be nonjusticiable a court need only conclude
that one Baker factor is present, not all).
222. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 728 (2008).
223. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 577 (2006) (citing Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S.
506, 508 (1916)) (stating that jurisdiction stripping does not take away a substantive right,
instead it simply changes the tribunal that hears the case), partially superseded by statute,
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2636.
224. Al.Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 8. Some commentators have argued Judge Bates could
and should have ruled on targeted killing as a matter of law in the Al-Aulaqi case. See, e.g., John
C. Dehn & Kevin Jon Heller, Debate, Targeted Killing. The Case of Anwar al-Aulaqi, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. PENNUMBRA 175, 177-78 (2011), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/
debate.php?did=40 (Dehn, Opening Statement); Benjamin McKelvey, Note, Due Process Rights
and the Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: The Unconstitutional Scope of Executive Killing
Power, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1353 (2011).
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distinguishable from military strikes. 225 Judges hold sway in law
enforcement decisions because that is where the judiciary has
expertise. Judges are not military commanders and are far removed
from the factors that go into making military decisions. For that
reason, the JAG Corps is a better choice for providing safeguards for
the rights of U.S. citizens than judges, sitting far away in
courthouses. 226
V. SOLUTION
U.S. citizens whom the U.S. government targets for killing
have greater rights than non-U.S. citizens whom the U.S. government
wishes to kill.227 Judge Bates, in his opinion dismissing the Al-Aulaqi
case, hit strongly on this point. The Judge explained that if the U.S.
citizen chooses not to avail himself of his constitutional rights, and the
U.S. government is unable to capture and bring him to trial, the
United States is not obliged to tolerate continued attacks.228
The citizen makes the choice to exercise his rights and decides
not to come before a U.S. court but instead decides to try to evade a
military strike. 229 For the citizen to make this choice, he must be put
on notice. 230 This notice protects his rights to life and liberty by giving
the citizen access to the judicial process guaranteed by the
Constitution to all citizens. 231 At a minimum, the U.S. government
needs to provide certain information to satisfy the notice requirement.
First, the government should formally disclose the existence of kill
225. Editorial, A Federal Judge Made the Right Decision on Targeted Killings, WASH. POST,
Dec. 21, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/21/
AR2010122105210.html.
226. Id.
227. Cf. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 51 (stating that the political question doctrine wanes
where the constitutional rights of a U.S. citizen are at stake, but does not make the doctrine
inapposite).
228. Id. at 17-18 (noting that nothing was preventing A1-Aulaqi from "peacefully presenting
himself at the U.S. Embassy in Yemen and expressing a desire to vindicate his constitutional
rights in U.S. courts" and that "[a]ll U.S. citizens may avail themselves of the U.S. judicial
system if they present themselves peacefully, and no U.S. citizen may simultaneously avail
himself of the U.S. judicial system and evade U.S. law enforcement authorities").
229. Id. (denying Al-Aulaqi's father standing for various reasons including that A1-Aulaqi did
have access to the courts, were he to avail himself).
230. Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) ("The essence of due
process is the requirement that 'a person in jeopardy of serious loss (be given) notice of the case




lists and the names of those U.S. citizens who are on them. Second,
the government should provide information detailing the specific
criteria that make citizens eligible for placement on a kill list. Then,
once the government establishes uniform standards, it should disclose
them.
With notice, the due process requirements of the Constitution
begin to take hold. If choice is at the core of the determination of
whether to strike the person as a military target or to try him as a
criminal, then there must be some determination that the person has
made that choice. If the person has been put on notice using the
Mullane standard232 that he is wanted for trial in the United States,
then the government can infer whether he wishes to exercise his trial
rights by whether he turns himself in or otherwise avails himself of
the judicial system. However, due to the importance of the interest at
stake and the possibility that the target was erroneously added to a
kill list, there needs to be additional protection.233 This Note suggests
assigning each targeted individual a JAG officer, who can raise
defenses on behalf of the individual.
A. Military Necessity
As targeted killing is a military operation, the decisions must
first be justified by reference to military necessity.234 Courts lack
competence to assess the particular disposition of military forces. 2
35
This Note believes that the JAG Corps and military commanders are
in the best position to determine the feasibility of a military operation.
The decisions can therefore be left to commanders' discretion, checked
by the adversarial process of the JAG Corps, to decide whether a
military strike against the person is necessary and proportionate.
232. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("An
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.").
233. Cf. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335 (1976) (stating that due process generally requires the
consideration of the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private interest and whether additional
or substitute procedural safeguards are needed).
234. See Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 13, at 47-51 (stating that
international humanitarian law ("IHL") has a strict requirement that lethal force be necessary).
235. Cf. E1-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(citing Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)) (stating that courts lack the competence to
assess the strategic decision to deploy force or create standards to determine whether it was
justified because the control of military forces are essentially professional military judgments,
subjected to civilian control by the legislative and executive branches).
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Second, for the targeted killing to be justified, it must further a
genuine military objective. This is true for all targeted killings, not
just those against U.S. citizens. Third, the attacks by the person
targeted and his organization must be likely to occur. The targeted
killing cannot be used as a reprisal for an earlier strike or merely to
settle a political score;236 it must be a genuine attack that is against a
military threat and that will damage the enemy's war-making
capabilities.
B. Process Due
The crux of the matter is what process is due to a U.S. citizen
before he can be killed in military strikes by his own government in
response to his role in planning and conducting military operations
against the United States. First and foremost, the U.S. citizen is
entitled to a neutral decisionmaking process. 237 This need not take the
form of a trial in an Article III court. 238 Rather, the executive can
create a neutral decisionmaking body within an agency for purposes of
determining whether a U.S. citizen will be killed.239 This function
could be served admirably by the JAG Corps or a similar organization
within the executive branch.
The first determination this neutral body will have to make in
all instances is the proposed target's combatant status and his level of
participation in the operations against the United States. The
decisionmaker will have to determine whether the person targeted for
killing is a lawful or unlawful combatant, a civilian (which
automatically bars the targeting of that individual for killing), or one
236. Cf., e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36 (1979) (stating that the Due Process
Clause prohibits the punishment of detainees prior to an adjudication of guilt).
237. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (holding that a citizen-detainee seeking to
challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive a fair opportunity to rebut the
Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker); cf. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333
(citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)) (stating that the fundamental requirement
of due process is the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner").
238. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538 (plurality opinion) (noting a possibility that a military
tribunal could meet the due process standards required but, lacking such process, an Article III
court that receives a habeas petition must ensure that the minimum requirements of due process
are achieved).
239. Cf. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 349 (holding that the Social Security Administration's
administrative review procedures provided effective process for the termination of disability
benefits).
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of the many proposed hybrids.240 If the decisionmaker finds that the
proposed target is actively participating in military operations against
the United States, then it can move on to the next stage of its
decisionmaking. Otherwise, the target would not be lawful. 241
Once the decisionmaker determines that the target is lawful,
U.S. citizen targets must be put on notice that their lives will be
forfeited if they fail to turn themselves over to the authorities. 242 Once
the government provides notice, the decisionmaker can decide the
sufficiency of this notice, which should embrace the totality of the
circumstances. If notice is sufficient, then the process can continue. If
there has not been sufficient notice, then the government must
provide additional notice.243
Having determined that the U.S. citizen is a lawful target with
sufficient notice, the decisionmaker then will evaluate the citizen's
ability to choose to exercise his rights to avail himself of the court
system. If the decisionmaker finds that the target has the ability to
choose what he will do and has decided not to exercise his rights, then
the process can continue.
Next, it falls on the decisionmaker to evaluate whether or not it
is possible to capture the individual. 244 This part of the inquiry is
necessary to satisfy the humanitarian law of proportionality. 245 If less
240. This Note discusses the relevant categories above. For greater detail see generally
Geneva Convention III, supra note 60, art. 4(A)(2) (stating who should be considered a prisoner
of war if captured); NILS MELZER, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/fileslother/icrc-002-
0990.pdf (detailing different classifications of civilians and armed forces in conflicts). Recruiters
and trainers in addition to proper fighters can also be targeted but they may be targeted only
during their participation, not after they have relinquished that function. Report of the Special
Rapporteur, supra note 13, 66-70.
241. See generally Geneva Conventions III, supra note 60, art. 4(A)(2) (stating who should be
considered a prisoner of war if captured).
242. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 597 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the plurality's opinion
seems to require notice to potential targets"); Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335 (citing Joint Anti-
Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) ('The
essence of due process is the requirement that 'a person in jeopardy of serious loss (be given)
notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.' ").
243. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950) (holding that
although a trustee followed the statutory requirements to provide constructive notice, with
regard to known beneficiaries, due process required additional service in those circumstances).
244. See Savage, supra note 1 (describing the secret Obama Administration policy not to kill
individuals it can capture).
245. See Rome Statute, supra note 64, art. 8(2)(b)(i) (stating that it is a war crime to
intentionally launch an attack that would cause incidental loss of civilian life if it was clearly
excessive to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated); Protocol I, supra note 12
(prohibiting an "attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
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harmful means for depriving the enemy of the war-making capability
provided by this U.S. citizen exist, then those means must be used.
The decisionmaker need not find that the military has tried and failed
to capture the individual, just that military leaders reasonably
decided that capture was not feasible. 246
Finally, the decisionmaker must review the military objective
that targeting and killing this U.S. citizen will serve. Only true
military targets are subject to military action. If all of the above
conditions are satisfied, then the targeted killing can proceed.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE BALANCE OF LIFE AND DEATH
The practice of targeted killing can be used in a manner that is
consistent with U.S. and international laws. Permissible targets will
be of a military nature, and killing them will serve a military
objective. No laws, international or domestic, prohibit the practice if it
is carried out by a state against an enemy of that state actively
engaged in an armed conflict against that state. When the target is a
U.S. citizen, the U.S. Constitution demands certain additional
procedures before the U.S. government may kill the target. The Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause dictates these procedures. The
procedures ensure a just determination of the target's permissibility
as a military matter and the subjective intent of the target not to avail
himself of the further protections to which he is entitled as an
American citizen. A neutral decisionmaker should balance the
targeted citizen's life against the risk he poses. If the decision comes
out against him, then the military may launch a strike.
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated").
246. See Savage, supra note 1 (describing the secret Obama Administration policy not to kill
individuals it can capture).
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This Note has shown that a program of targeted killing of U.S.
citizens could be lawful under certain circumstances. Specifically, I
propose a system where the targeted citizen receives notice and an
opportunity for a hearing followed by a JAG determination of his
decision not to avail himself of further process and of his
permissibility as a military target. This would balance the target's
interest in his life against the threat he poses to the lives of his fellow
Americans. When we must, we will kill our fellow American before he
can kill us.
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